Far away but still close

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Overview

- I. Intro
- II. What's the benefit?
- III. Remote Management Devices
- IV. Operation




l. Intro

Out-of-Band end devices:

- a) Serial-over-IP, vulgo console servers
- b) KVM-over-IP
- c) Remote-Power
- d) Management processors (covering a+c)



I. Intro



I. Intro

	KVM-over-IP	console servers
Ethernet in	cable+adapter to node	1-48 R J45 serial out (port X001-X048, X=2-7)
Access nodes	by different means(VNC)	telnet^Wssh to TCP port
bandwidth	high (>>= 2Ch ISDN)	low (>= GSM)
Client preq	beefier (GUI)	low
Hook up:	systems with GUI only	everyth. w/ serial port
Config node	res.+color depth (device) == res.+color (node)	often required



- Higher Availability
- Money
- Productivity
- Saves space
- Security reasons



Higher Availability:

- marketing speak: reduces downtime
- sysadmin speak: don't have to come in in the middle of the night (fast reaction)
- access ~ from all over the world (but: security)



Money:

- lost earnings
- penalties (SLA)
- costumers leaving, non-satisfaction



Productivity:

- data center is cold+uncomfortable
- maintenance/emergency operations better from comfortable "admin commander center/chair"
- flexibility



Space:

- data center space wasted
- it's precious



II. Why not...

... use it if not properly addressed:

Security:

- reciprocal relation:
 you hook up important systems which you definitely don't want to get hacked
- KVM+serial-over-IP: management access to other systems
- power strip / lights out is the DoS tool



 Time of console servers with propriety OS is over (Cisco 2511, Xyplex Maxserver, Lantronix SCSxx00)

- embedded Linux!
 - "8.5" vendors: Avocent/Cyclades, Digi, Raritan, Perle,
 Lantronix, MRV, Logical, Opengear
 - CPU Arch: PPC, Arm, MIPS, i386
 (48 MHz PPC to 1 GHz PIII)



III. Remote Management Devices a) Unix / serial

User interfaces (administration / operation):

- Linux command shell
- Proprietary shells:
 from sophisticated (IOS-like, MRV) to relatively dumb
- Web browser
- Java applets, applications
- any combinations of the above



Watch out for:

- Security (more below)
- Syslog forwarding:
 - kernel + authpriv messages +port connects of/to console servers
- NTP: more or less (restrictions of busybox NTP)



Further considerations:

- Port buffer (forward/handling)
 - alarm triggered on strings (e.g. Sparc's OK)
 - channel alarming: e-mail, syslog, snmptrap, ...
 - finding culprits: who/what crashed the machine?
- Integration into company frameworks:
 - management: SNMP agent/traps
 - authentication: RADIUS/TACACS+/LDAP/...



Nice to have:

- Port status (wrong serial adapters/cables)
- no fans (can fail, thus can system)
- Factory reset

- cross development kit
- redundancy options: dual PSU, dual Ethernet
- PCMCIA-Slots, if needed



Last years <u>review</u> for <u>iX-magazine</u>:

- GPL compliance
- Security shop of horrors (all w/o auth. just from nw!):
 - mode 777 busybox binary
 - accounts w/o passwords ("protected" by .bashrc)
 - retrieving SSH-private key via HTTP (+SSL cert.)
 - retrieving of port/console server logs via HTTP
 - snmp public write community



security, cont'd:

- bypassing user authentication for serial port
- too many default cleartext protocols
- portmapper started, why?
- nmap on a console server?



III. Remote Management Devices

b) Windows (et al)

- → KVM-over-IP has been around since 2000
- → "poor man's solution": VNC/RDP over SSH
- → Windows 2003



KVM over IP:

- KVM signals electronically transformed in VNC
- K,M: (USB), PS/2, Sun
- V: VGA-UXGA (RGB), DVI?
- Access via:
 - Java-capable browser
 - VNC viewer
 - ActiveX needed sometimes (ups)



KVM over IP:

- in theory w/o configuration from BIOS to OS GUI
- Price: is ~30% more than console server addt'l. cost (~ 100 Euros per node)
 for converter to VNC
- available as PCI card / appliance



VNC over SSH:

- no OOB technology
 - → needs kernel + IF up & running
- VNC/RDP tunneled over PPP (eth. if s/w)
- integrated in
 - → Opengear's console server: SDT
 - → Digi: virtual KVM



Windows 2003 (watch your neighbor):

- comes with Emergency Management Service
- text mode, also for recovery console
- serial redirection of BIOS is on during install:
 - → EMS activated

(bootcfg /EMS on /PORT port /BAUD baud)



Windows 2003 (cont'd):

- if OS is up: Special Administration Console
- prompt: limited command set
- cmd after authentication gives cmd.exe



III. Remote Management Devices c) Remote Power

Remote Power Management

- last resort action if system is hung
- STONITH: e.g. for HA/GFS cluster
- some servers provide proprietary means:
 on-board / PCI management processor



III. Remote Management Devices c) Remote Power

Simple type:

- serial only
- default no password
- simple user management
- give outlets meaningful names
- that's about it
- → hook up to console server



III. Remote Management Devices c) Remote Power

Smarter types (embedded system):

- IP stack, telnet/HTTP
- some: HTTPS/SSH, SNMP agent/traps
- some: alarming on power changes
- seldom: smart power up sequence after power failure (dependencies e.g. file server <--> mail server)



How do I manage/operate my OOB equipment?

- Hardware
- Software

- both: C/S architecture
 - server: manages OOB end devices
 - client: UI



Hardware (from one vendor):

- console servers: clustering (based on NAT)
- mixed environ. of KVM, CS, power strips:
 - "management appliances", vendor specific:
 - Raritan Command Center
 - Cyclades Alterpath Manager
 - Lantronix SecureLinx Management Appliance
 - some integrate IPMI, HP ILO, Sun ALOM, Dell DRAC



Software (needs hardware to run server part on):

- <u>conserver:</u>
 - free, not GPL (original: Ohio State University L.)
 - only console servers

- C(-)LIM / MO:
 - commercial (Ki Networks)
 - variety of OOB-end devices



CLIM/MO and conserver have in common:

- user/group management
- management of distributed end devices
- multiple r/o connections
- kick off other r/w connection
- log file handling
 (not limited to port buffer of embedded system)



conserver:

debian sid/no-free:

```
conserver-client conserver-server
```

- configure && make && make install
- better: --with-openssl --with-libwrap
 --with-port=842 --with-pam --with-master=name



conserver:

- \$prefix/etc/conserver.cf (self-explanatory):
 - console server, port/portbase, portincr, protocol
 - serial parameters (bps,parity), break sequence
 - log files
 - ACL's:
 - IP/DNS
 - user names/groups
 - ro/rw access



CLIM:

- Windows + Unix platforms
- additional GUI for connect, config
- configures known console servers
- "backup-failover" (BFD) = CLIM cluster
- notification upon pattern (e-mail, snmptrap, pager)
- power management, KVMoIP, ALOM, ILO, vnc/rdp



CLIM:

- gang-connect
- e-layer binary/emser tunnel:
 - runs embedded in some console servers
 - provides one channel w/ proprietary encryption (→ security?)
 instead of multiple telnet/ssh TCP connections



MO:

- successor of CLIM, upgrade needs vendor help
- complete new (G)UI, has really anyth. else changed?
- well: only emser tunnels
 - no support of "legacy" console servers

- CLIM+MO:
 - no ChangeLog
 - no clear release cycles
 - English only (not operators' mother tongue)



IV. Operation a.) practical hints

quick'n dirty stuff:

- everybody knows (laptop / neighbor computer):
 tip, minicom, hyperterm + null modem cable
- terminal program old serial palm pilot: ptelnet
- multiport serial cards + Opengear CD = console server
- watch out for cables:
 - pinout of DB9/25 is standardized
 - serial RJ45 is not



IV. Operation a.) practical hints

- Sun SPARC is smart
- PC config under Linux:
 - BIOS + bootloader + kernel + init (Remote Serial HOWTO)
 - some progress bars limited by serial throughput (9600bps)
 - syslog messages on console:
 - kern.warning; *.err; authpriv.none
 - logging issue: Linux-Firewall (log-level)
 - console on syslog server: NTsyslog is a hog



IV. Operation b.) Security considerations

exchange: physical (computer room) w/ network security

- measures (network/OOB device):
 - keep track of firmware updates!
 - dedicated management LAN w/ tight access rules (hack/workaround: host firewall on OOB device)
 - avoid cleartext protocols
 - add user to OOB device, don't work as root/admin
 - force authentication to console server (pw, ssh-pub key)



IV. Operation b.) Security considerations

- measures (network/devices), cont'd:
 - be very careful with port logs:
 - how you forward it (SMB, NFS, syslog, MO/conserver)
 - where you store it
 - input: don't enable it (passwords of nodes)
 - output: be aware that it may contain sensible info, too show config, cat /etc/shadow, iwconfig



IV. Operation b.) Security considerations

- measures (nodes):
 - log out (session hijacking)
 - boot password
 - maybe reconsider:
 - SysRq / STOP-A /...
 - direct root login console while initlevel=3,5



Thanks for your patience

Questions?

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